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Abstract
Susceptibility of deep neural networks to adversarial attacks
poses a major theoretical and practical challenge. All efforts
to harden classifiers against such attacks have seen limited
success till now. Two distinct categories of samples against
which deep neural networks are vulnerable, “adversarial sam-
ples” and “fooling samples”, have been tackled separately so
far due to the difficulty posed when considered together. In
this work, we show how one can defend against them both
under a unified framework. Our model has the form of a varia-
tional autoencoder with a Gaussian mixture prior on the latent
variable, such that each mixture component corresponds to
a single class. We show how selective classification can be
performed using this model, thereby causing the adversarial
objective to entail a conflict. The proposed method leads to the
rejection of adversarial samples instead of misclassification,
while maintaining high precision and recall on test data. It
also inherently provides a way of learning a selective classi-
fier in a semi-supervised scenario, which can similarly resist
adversarial attacks. We further show how one can reclassify
the detected adversarial samples by iterative optimization.1
1 Introduction
The vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial at-
tacks has generated a lot of interest and concern in the past
few years. The fact that these networks can be easily fooled
by adding specially crafted noise to the input, such that the
original and modified inputs are indistinguishable to humans
(2014), clearly suggests that they fail to mimic the human
learning process. Even though these networks achieve state-
of-the-art performance, often surpassing human level perfor-
mance (2015; 2017) on the test data used for different tasks,
their vulnerability is a cause of concern when deploying them
in real life applications, especially in domains such as health
care (2018), autonomous vehicles (2018) and defense, etc.
1.1 Adversarial Attacks and Defenses
Adversarially crafted samples can be classified into two broad
categories, namely (i) adversarial samples (2014) and (ii)
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fooling samples as defined by (2015). Existence of adversar-
ial samples was first shown by Szegedy et al. (2014), while
fooling samples (2015), which are closely related to the idea
of “rubbish class” images (1998) were introduced by Nguyen
et al. (2015). Evolutionary algorithms were applied to in-
puts drawn from a uniform distribution, using the predicted
probability corresponding to the targeted class as the fitness
function (2015) to craft such fooling samples. It has also
been shown that Gaussian noise can be directly used to trick
classifiers into predicting one of the output classes with very
high probability (2014).
Adversarial attack methods can be classified into (i) white
box attacks (2014; 2014; 2017b; 2016a; 2016; 2018), which
use knowledge of the machine learning model (such as model
architecture, loss function used during training, etc.) for craft-
ing adversarial samples, and (ii) black box attacks (2017;
2016; 2017), which only require the model for obtaining
labels corresponding to input samples. Both these kinds of at-
tacks can be further split into two sub categories, (i) targeted
attacks, which trick the model into producing a chosen out-
put, and (ii) non-targeted attacks, which cause the model to
produce any undesired output (2014). The majority of attacks
and defenses have dealt with adversarial samples so far (2014;
2014; 2016b), while a relatively smaller literature deals with
fooling samples (2015). However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no prior method tries to defend against both kinds of
samples simultaneously under a unified framework. State-
of-the-art defense mechanisms have tried to harden a clas-
sifier by one or more of the following techniques: adver-
sarial retraining (2014), preprocessing inputs (2014), de-
ploying auxiliary detection networks (2017a) or obfuscat-
ing gradients (2018). One common drawback of these de-
fense mechanisms is that they do not eliminate the vulner-
ability of deep networks altogether, but only try to defend
against previously proposed attack methods. Hence, they
have been easily broken by stronger attacks, which are specif-
ically designed to overcome their defense strategies (2016;
2018).
Szegedy et al. (2014) argue that the primary reason for
the existence of adversarial samples is the presence of small
“pockets” in the data manifold, which are rarely sampled in
the training or test set. On the other hand, Goodfellow et
al. (2014) have proposed the “linearity hypothesis” to explain
the presence of adversarial samples. Under our approach as
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detailed in Sec. 3.4, the adversarial objective poses a fun-
damental conflict of interest, and inherently addresses both
these possible explanations.
1.2 Approach
We design a generative model that finds a latent random vari-
able z such that data label y and the data x become condition-
ally independent given z, i.e., P (x,y|z) = P (x|z)P (y|z).
We base our generative model on VAEs (2014), and obtain
an inference model that represents P (z|x) and a generative
model that represents P (x|z). We perform label inference
P (y|x) by computing arg maxy P (y|z = EP (z|x)[z]). We
choose the latent space distribution P (z) to be a mixture of
Gaussians, such that each mixture component represents one
of the classes in the data. Under this construct, inferring the
label given latent encoding, i.e., P (y|z) becomes trivial by
computing the contribution of the mixture components. Ad-
versarial samples are dealt with by thresholding in the latent
and output spaces of the generative model and rejecting the
inputs for which P (x) ≈ 0. In Figure 1, we describe our
network at test and train time.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We show how VAE’s can be trained with labeled data,
using a Gaussian mixture prior on the latent variable in
order to perform classification.
• We perform selective classification using this framework,
thereby rejecting adversarial and fooling samples.
• We propose a method to learn a classifier in a semi-
supervised scenario using the same framework, and show
that this classifier is also resistant against adversarial at-
tacks.
• We also show how the detected adversarial samples can be
reclassified into the correct class by iterative optimization.
• We verify our claims through experimentation on 3 pub-
licly available datasets: MNIST (1998), SVHN (2011) and
COIL-100 (1996).
2 Related Work
A few pieces of work in the existing literature on defense
against adversarial attacks have attempted to use generative
models in different ways.
Samangouei et al. (2018) propose training a Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN) on the training data of a clas-
sifier, and use this network to project every test sample on
to the data manifold by iterative optimization. This method
does not try to detect adversarial samples, and does not tackle
“fooling images”. Further, this defense technique has been
recently shown to be ineffective (2018). Other pieces of work
have also shown that adversarial samples can lie on the output
manifold of generative models trained on the training data
for a classifier (2018).
PixelDefend, proposed by Song et al. (2018a) also uses
a generative model to detect adversarial samples, and then
rectifies the classifier output by projecting the adversarial
input back to the data manifold. However, Athalye et al. have
shown that this method can also be broken by bypassing
the exploding/vanishing gradient problem introduced by the
defense mechanism.
MagNet (2017b) uses autoencoders to detect adversarial
inputs, and is similar to our detection mechanism in the way
reconstruction threshold is used for detecting adversarial
inputs. This defense method does not claim security in the
white box setting. Further, the technique has also been broken
in the grey box setting by recently proposed attack methods
(2017a).
Traditional autoencoders do not constrain the latent rep-
resentation to have a specific distribution like variational
autoencoders. Our use of variational autoencoders allows us
to defend against adversarial and fooling inputs simultane-
ously, by using thresholds in the latent and output spaces of
the model in conjunction. This makes the method secure to
white box attacks as well, which is not the case with MagNet.
Further, even state of the art defense mechanisms (2018)
and certified defenses have been shown to be ineffective for
simple datasets such as MNIST (2018b). We show via exten-
sive experimentation on different datasets how our method is
able to defend against strong adversarial attacks, as well as
end to end white box attacks.
3 Method
3.1 Variational Autoencoders
We consider the dataset X = {x(i)}Ni=1 consisting of N
i.i.d. samples of a random variable x in the space X . Let z
be the latent representation from which the data is assumed
to have been generated. Similar to Kingma et al. (2014),
we assume that the data generation process consists of two
steps: (i) a value z(i) is sampled from a prior distribution
Pθ∗(z); (ii) a value x(i) is generated from a conditional dis-
tribution Pθ∗(x|z). We also assume that the prior Pθ∗(z)
and likelihood Pθ∗(x|z) come from parametric families of
distributions Pθ(z) and Pθ(x|z) respectively. In order to max-
imize the data likelihood Pθ(x) =
∫
Pθ(z)Pθ(x|z)dz, VAEs
(2014) use an encoder network Qφ(z|x), that approximates
Pθ(z|x). The evidence lower bound (ELBO) for VAE is given
by
ELBO(x, θ, φ) = Ez∼Qφ(z|x)[logPθ(x|z)]
−DKL[Qφ(z|x)||P (z)]
(1)
where DKL represents the KL divergence measure. Using
a Gaussian prior Pθ(z) and a Gaussian posterior Qφ(z|x),
variational autoencoders maximize this lower bound deriving
a closed form expression for the KL divergence term.
3.2 Modifying the Evidence Lower Bound
VAEs do not enforce any lower or upper bound on encoder
entropyH(Qφ(z|x)). This can result in blurry reconstruction
due to sample averaging in case of overlap in the latent space.
On the other hand, unbounded decrease in H(Qφ(z|x)) is
not desirable either, as in that case the VAE can degenerate
to a deterministic autoencoder leading to holes in the latent
space. Hence, we seek an alternative design in which we fix
this quantity to a constant value. In order to do so, we express
the KL divergence in terms of entropy.
DKL[Qφ(z|x) ‖Pθ(z)]
= −Ez∼Qφ(z|x) [log Pθ(z)− log Qφ(z|x)]
= −Ez∼Qφ(z|x) [log Pθ(z)] + Ez∼Qφ(z|x) [log Qφ(z|x)]
= H(Qφ(z|x), Pθ(z))−H(Qφ(z|x))
(2)
where H(Qφ(z|X), Pθ(z)) represents the cross entropy be-
tween Qφ(z|X) and Pθ(z). It can be noted that we need to
minimize the KL divergence term. Hence, if we assume that
H(Qφ(z|x)) is constant, then we can drop this term during
optimization (please refer to the next section for details of
how H(Qφ(z|x)) is enforced to be constant). This lets us re-
place the KL divergence DKL[Qφ(z|X) ‖Pθ(z)] in the loss
function with H(Qφ(z|X), Pθ(z)).
ELBO(x, θ, φ)
= Ez∼Qφ(z|x)[logPθ(x|z)]−H(Qφ(z|x), Pθ(z))
= Ez∼Qφ(z|x)[logPθ(x|z)] + Ez∼Qφ(z|x) [log Pθ(z)]
(3)
The choice of fixing the entropy of Qφ(z|x) is further justi-
fied via experiments in section 4.
3.3 Supervision using a Gaussian Mixture Prior
In this section, we modify the above ELBO term for super-
vised learning by including the random variable y denoting
labels. The following expression can be derived for the log-
likelihood of the data.
log(Pθ(x,y)) = Ez∼Qφ(z|x)[log(Pθ(x,y|z))]
−DKL[Qφ(z|x)||Pθ(z)] +DKL[Qφ(z|x)||Pθ(z|x,y)]
(4)
Noting that DKL[Qφ(z|x)||Pθ(z|x,y)] ≥ 0, and replac-
ing DKL[Qφ(z|x)||Pθ(z)] with Ez∼Qφ(z|x) [log Pθ(z)] by
assuming H(Qφ(z|x)) to be constant (as shown in Eqn. 3),
we get the following lower bound on the data likelihood.
ELBO(x,y, θ, φ) = Ez∼Qφ(z|x)[log(Pθ(x,y|z))]
+Ez∼Qφ(z|x) [log Pθ(z)]
(5)
We choose our VAE to use a Gaussian mixture prior for
the latent variable z. We further choose the number of mix-
ture components to be equal to the number of classes k in
the training data. The means of each of these components,
µ1,µ2, ...,µk are assumed to be the one-hot encodings of
the class labels in the latent space. It can be noted here
that although this choice enforces the latent dimensional-
ity to be k, it can be easily altered by choosing the means
in a different manner. For example, means of all the mix-
ture components can lie on a single axis in the latent space.
Unlike usual VAEs, our encoder network outputs only the
mean of Qφ(z|x). We use the reparameterization trick intro-
duced by Kingma et al. (2014), but sample the input  from
N(0,Σconstant) in order to enforce the entropy of Qφ(z|x)
to be constant. Here, each mixture component corresponds
to one class and x is assumed to be generated from the la-
tent space according to Pθ(x|z) irrespective of y. There-
fore, x and y become conditionally independent given z, i.e.
log(Pθ(x,y|z)) = log(Pθ(x|z)) + log(Pθ(y|z)).
ELBO(x,y, θ, φ)
= Ez∼Qφ(z|x) [log(Pθ(x|z)) + log(Pθ(y|z)) + log Pθ(z)]
= Ez∼Qφ(z|x) [log(Pθ(x|z)) + log(Pθ(z|y)) + log Pθ(y)]
(6)
Assuming the the classes to be equally likely, the final loss
function for an input x(i) with label y(i) becomes the follow-
ing.
L(x(i),y(i), ) = ||x(i) − g(f(x(i)) + )||2
+ α||f(x(i))− µy(i) ||2
(7)
where the encoder is represented by f , the decoder is rep-
resented by g and µy(i) represents the mean of the mixture
component corresponding to y(i). α is a hyper-parameter that
trades off between reconstruction fidelity, latent space prior
and classification accuracy.
The label y for an input sample x can be obtained follow-
ing the Bayes Decision rule.
arg max
y
Pθ(y|x) = arg max
y
Pθ(x,y)
= arg max
y
∫
z
Pθ(x,y|z)Pθ(z)dz
= arg max
y
∫
z
Pθ(x|z)Pθ(y|z)Pθ(z)dz
= arg max
y
∫
z
Pθ(z|x)Pθ(y|z)Pθ(x)dz
= arg max
y
∫
z
Pθ(z|x)Pθ(y|z)dz
(8)
Pθ(z|x) can be approximated by Qφ(z|x), i.e., the encoder
distribution. This corresponds to the Bayes decision rule, in
the scenario where there is no overlap among the classes in
the input space, φ has enough variability and Qφ∗(z|x) is
able to match Pθ∗(z|x) exactly.
Semi-supervised learning follows automatically, by using
the loss function in Eqn. 7 for labeled samples, and the loss
corresponding to Eqn. 3 for unlabeled samples.
In order to compute the class label as defined in equation 8,
we use a single sample estimate of the integration by simply
using the mean of Qφ(z|x) as the z value in our experiments.
This choice does not affect the accuracy as long as the mixture
components representing the classes are well separated in the
latent space.
3.4 Resisting adversarial attacks
In order to successfully reject adversarial samples irrespec-
tive of the method of its generation, we use thresholding at
the encoder and decoder outputs. This allows us to reject
any sample x whose encoding z has low probability under
Pθ(z), i.e., if the distance between its encoding and the en-
coding of the predicted class label in the latent space exceeds
a threshold value, τenc (since Pθ(z) is a mixture of Gaus-
sians). We further reject those input samples which have low
probability under Pθ(x|z), i.e., if the reconstruction error
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) The model at training time. All the inputs are in green, while all the losses are in brown. (b) Model pipeline at
inference time. The red dot shows that the attacker is successful in fooling the encoder by placing its output in the wrong class.
However, it results in a high reconstruction error, since the decoder generates an image of the target class.
exceeds a certain threshold, τdec (since Pθ(x|z) is Gaussian).
Essentially, a combination of these two thresholds ensures
that Pθ(x) =
∫
z
Pθ(x|z)Pθ(z)dz is not low.
Both τenc and τdec can be determined based on statistics
obtained while training the model. In our experiments, we
implement thresholding in the latent space as follows: we
calculate the Mahalanobis distance between the encoding of
the input and the encoding of the corresponding mixture com-
ponent mean, and reject the sample if it exceeds the critical
chi-square value (3σ rule in the univariate case). Similarly, for
τdec, we use the corresponding value for the reconstructions
errors. However, in general, any value can be assigned to
these two thresholds, and they determine the risk to coverage
trade-off for this selective classifier.
If the maximum allowed Lp norm of the perturbation η is
γ, then the adversary, trying to modify an input x from class
c1, must satisfy the following criteria.
1. arg minci ||f(x + η)− µci ||2 = c2 where c2 6= c1
2. ||f(x + η)− µc2 ||2 ≤ τenc
3. ||η||p ≤ γ
4. ||(x + η) − g(f(x + η) + )||2 ≤ τdec where  ∼
N(0,Σconstant)
By the first three constraints, the encoding of x and x + η
must belong to different Gaussian mixture components in
the latent space. However, constraint 4 requires the distance
between the reconstruction obtained from the encoding of
x + η to be close to x + η, i.e., close to x in the pixel
space. This is extremely hard to satisfy because of the low
probability of occurrence of holes in the latent space within
τenc distance from the means.
Similarly, for the case of fooling samples, it can be ar-
gued that even if an attacker manages to generate a fooling
sample which tricks the encoder, it will be very hard to si-
multaneously trick the decoder to reconstruct a similar image
belonging to the rubbish class.
3.5 Reclassification
Once a sample is detected as adversarial by either or both
the thresholds discussed above, we attempt to find its true
label using the decoder only. By definition of adversarial
images, xadv = xorg + η, where xadv is the adversarial
image corresponding to the original image xorg, and ||η||p
is small. Hence, we can conclude that for any given image x,
||x−xadv||p ≈ ||x−xorg||p. Suppose z∗ is given by Eqn. 9.
z∗ = arg min
z
||g(z)− xorg||p (9)
Following the argument stated above, we can approx-
imate z∗ ≈ z∗adv = arg minz ||g(z)− xadv||p. We
can now find the label of the adversarial sample as
arg minci ||µci − z∗adv||2. Essentially, for reclassification,
we try to find the z in the latent space, which, when decoded,
gives the minimum reconstruction error from the adversarial
input. However, if Eqn. 9 returns a z that lies beyond τenc
from the corresponding mean, or if the reconstruction error
exceeds τdec, we conclude that the sample is a fooling sam-
ple and reject the sample. It can be noted here that if this
network is deployed in a scenario where fooling samples are
not expected to be encountered, one can choose not to reject
samples during reclassification, thereby increasing coverage.
Also, starting from a single value of z can cause the opti-
mization process to get stuck at a local minimum. A better
alternative is to run k different optimization processes with
z = µ1,µ2, . . . ,µk as the initial values, and choose the z
which gives minimum reconstruction error as z∗adv. Given
enough compute power is available, these k processes can
be run in parallel. In our experiments, we follow these two
strategies while reclassifying adversarial samples.
4 Experiments
We verify the effectiveness of our network through numer-
ical results and visual analysis on three different datasets -
MNIST, SVHN and COIL-100. For different datasets, we
make minimal changes to the hyper-parameters of our net-
work, partly due to the difference in the image size and image
type (grayscale/colored) in each dataset.
Implementation details. We use an encoder network with
convolution, max-pooling and dense layers to parameter-
ize Qφ(z|x), and a decoder network with convolution, up-
sampling and dense layers to parameterize Pθ(x|z). We
choose the dimensionality of the latent space to be the same
as the number of classes for MNIST and COIL-100. However,
noting that the size of images is larger for SVHN compared
to MNIST, and also, because the dataset contains colored
images, we choose the dimensionality of the latent space
Figure 2: Generated images from different classes of MNIST, COIL-100, SVHN.
for SVHN as 32 instead of 10. The choice of means also
varies slightly for this dataset, as we pad zeros to the one-hot
encodings of the class labels to allow for the extra latent
dimensions. The standard deviation of the encoder distribu-
tion is chosen such that the chance of overlap of the mixture
components in the latent space is negligible and the classes
are well separated. We use 1/3000 as the variance for the
MNIST dataset, and reduce this value as the latent dimen-
sionality increases for the other datasets. We use the ReLU
nonlinearity in our network, and sigmoid activation in the
final layer so that the output lies in the allowed range [0, 1].
We use the Adam(2014) optimizer for training.
Qualitative evaluation. Since our algorithm relies upon
the reconstruction error between the generated and the orig-
inal samples, we first show a few randomly chosen images
generated by the network (for both supervised ad semi-
supervised scenarios) corresponding to test samples of differ-
ent classes from the three datasets in Figure 2.
Numerical results. In Table 1, we present the accuracy,
error and rejection percentages obtained by our method with
and without thresholding. For semi-supervised learning, we
have taken 100 randomly chosen labeled samples from each
class for both MNIST and SVHN during training. It is impor-
tant to note here that the SOTA for COIL-100 was obtained
on a random train-test split of the dataset, and hence, the
accuracy values are not directly comparable.
Adversarial attacks on encoder. We use the encoder part
of the network trained on the MNIST dataset to generate
adversarial samples using the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) with varying  values (2014). The corresponding
results are shown in Figure 3. The behavior is as desired,
i.e., with increasing , percentage of misclassified samples
rises to a maximum value of only 3.89% and then decreases,
while the accuracy decreases monotonically and the rejection
percentage increases monotonically. Similar results are ob-
tained for the semi-supervised model, as shown in Figure 3,
although the maximum error rate is higher in this case. We
further tried the FGSM attack from the Cleverhans library
(2017) with the default parameters on the SVHN and COIL-
100 datasets, and all the generated samples were rejected by
the models after thresholding. Similarly, we generated ad-
versarial samples for all three datasets using stronger attacks
from Cleverhans with default parameter settings, including
the Momentum Iterative Method (2018) and Projected Gra-
dient Descent (2018). In these cases as well, all generated
adversarial samples were successfully rejected by threshold-
ing.
This indicates that since all these attacks lack knowledge
of the decoder network, they only manage to produce samples
which fool the encoder network, but are easily detected at the
decoder output. From this set of experiments, we conclude
that the only effective method of attacking our model would
be to design a complete white-box attack that has knowledge
of the decoder loss as well, as well as the two thresholds.
Further, since we do not use any form of gradient obfuscation
in our defense mechanism, a complete white-box attacker
would represent a strong adversary.
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Epsilon
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ra
tio
Accuracy
Error
Reject
Accuracy (Semi-supervised)
Error (Semi-supervised)
Reject (Semi-supervised)
Figure 3: We run FGSM with varying  on the models trained
on MNIST data in both supervised and semi-supervised
scenarios. Although the error rate is higher for the semi-
supervised network, the rejection ratio rises monotonically
for both networks with increasing , and the error rate for the
supervised model stays below 5%.
White-box adversarial attack. We present the results for
completely white-box targeted attack on our model for the
COIL-100 and MNIST datasets in figures 4a and 4b. Here,
the adversary has complete knowledge of the encoder, the
decoder, as well as the rejection thresholds. The results shown
correspond to random samples from the first two classes
of objects for the COIL-100 dataset, and the classes 2 and
5 for MNIST dataset. We perform gradient descent on the
adversarial objective as given in Eqn. 10. The target class is
set to 6 for MNIST images from class 2, 9 for MNIST images
from class 5, and the class other than that of the source image
Supervised Semi-supervised
Without With Without With
thresholding thresholding thresholding thresholding
Dataset SOTA Accuracy Accuracy Error Rejection Accuracy Accuracy Error Rejection
MNIST 99.79% 99.67% 97.97% 0.22% 1.81% 99.1% 98.17% 0.52% 1.31%
SVHN 98.31% 95.06% 92.80% 4.58% 2.62% 86.42% 83.54% 13.64% 2.82%
COIL-100 99.11% 99.89% 98.40% 0% 1.60% - - - -
Table 1: Comparison between the performance of the state-of-the-art (SOTA) models and our model. We show that our method,
even without much fine tuning focused on achieving classification accuracy, is competitive with the SOTA. MNIST SOTA is as
reported by (2013), SVHN SOTA is as given by (2016) and the SOTA for COIL-100 is given by (2015).
for the COIL-100 images.
arg min
η
Ladv =
arg min
η
[((||xo + η − g(f(xo + η))||2)/τdec)a
+ ((µt − f(xo + η))Σt(µt − f(xo + η))/τenc)b + ||η||2]
(10)
where xo is the original image we wish to corrupt, µt is
the mean of target class, η is the noise added, f, g are the
encoder and decoder respectively, and Σt denotes target class
covariance in latent space. a > 1 and b > 1 represent con-
stant exponents which ensure that the adversarial loss grows
steeply when the two threshold values are exceeded. Essen-
tially, we aim for low reconstruction error and small change
in the adversarial image while moving its embedding close
to the target class mean. η is initialized with zeros.
We also ran the white box attack on 100 randomly sampled
images from each of the 10 classes for MNIST and SVHN,
by setting each of the 9 other classes as the target class. The
samples generated by optimizing the adversarial objective in
each of these cases were either correctly classified or rejected.
Fooling images. We take 100 images sampled from the
uniform distribution as inputs and optimize the white-box
fooling attack objective given by Eqn. 11, with each of the
classes from the MNIST and SVHN datasets as the target
classes. In Figure 4c, we visualize some of the images to
which the attack converged and their reconstructions for the
MNIST dataset, with the target classes 1, 2, . . . , 6.
arg min
η
Lfool = arg min
η
[(||η − g(f(η))||2/τdec)a
+ ((µt − f(η))Σt(µt − f(η))/τenc)b]
(11)
Here, η, a, b, f , g, Σt and µt are as described in sec. 4.
It has been shown that fooling samples are extremely easy
to generate for state-of-the-art classifier networks (2014;
2015). Our technique, by design, gains resilience against
such attacks as well. Since by definition, a fooling sample
cannot look like a legitimate sample, it can not have small
pixel space distance with any real image. This is exactly what
can be noticed in the results in Figure 4c, where reconstruc-
tion errors are very high. Hence, most of the images to which
this attack converges are rejected at the decoder, although
they had managed to fool the encoder when considered in
isolation. For the few cases where the images are not rejected,
we observe that the attack method actually converged to a
legitimate image of the target class.
Reclassifying Adversarial samples. In this section we
present the performance of our reclassification technique. Al-
though one could have used our decoder network to perform
both “ordinary” and “adversarial” sample classification using
Eqn. 9, but this process involves an iterative optimization.
Hence, we only use it for the detected adversarial samples.
The results are summarized in Table 2.
 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.30
Accuracy 97% 93% 91% 87% 87%
Table 2: We present the reclassification accuracy for samples
generated using FGSM on the MNIST dataset.
Following the same reclassification scheme, we also find
that the method is able to correctly classify rejected test
samples, thereby improving the overall accuracy achieved by
the proposed method. For example, among the 181 samples
rejected by the supervised model for the MNIST test dataset
(as per Table 1), 110 samples are now correctly classified,
improving the accuracy to 99.07%.
Entropy of Qφ(z|x). To compare the performance of the
proposed network with the corresponding network with vari-
able entropy of Qφ(z|x), we ran experiments by letting
H(Qφ(z|x)) to be variable, and keeping all other param-
eters same. We tried the FGSM attack against the encoder of
the model thus obtained, and observed that the adversarial
sample detection capability of the network reduces drasti-
cally. This is justified by the fact that the reconstructions
tend to be blurry in this case, thereby leading to a high re-
construction threshold. The results are shown in figure 5. In
order to further study the difference between the two cases,
we train both variants of the network on the CelebA dataset,
and observe that the Fre´chet Inception Distance (FID) (2017)
score is significantly better for the model with a constant
H(Qφ(z|x)) (50.4) than the one with variable H(Qφ(z|x))
(58.3). The FID scores are obtained by randomly sampling
10, 000 points from the latent distribution, and comparing the
distribution of the images generated from the these points
with the training image distribution.
Adversarial Samples (MNIST) Adversarial Samples (COIL) Fooling Samples
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: White box attack on MNIST and COIL dataset. (a) Targeted attack on MNIST. (b) Targeted attack on COIL. (c)
Targeted fooling sample attack on MNIST. The first row represents the images to which the white-box attack converged, and the
second row represents the corresponding reconstructed images.
Figure 5: We run FGSM with varying  on the model with
variable encoder distribution entropy, trained on MNIST data.
The rejection rate stays low in this case, while the error rate
increases with increasing .
5 Discussion
In this work, we have successfully demonstrated how a gen-
erative model can be used to gain defensive strength against
adversarial attacks on images of relatively high resolution
(128x128 for the COIL-100 dataset for example). However,
the proposed network is limited by the generative capabil-
ity of VAE based architectures, and thus, might not scale
effectively to ImageNet scale datasets (2009). In spite of this
fact, keeping the underlying principles for adversarial sam-
ple detection and reclassification as described in this work,
recent advances in invertible generative models such as Glow
(2018) can be exploited to scale to more complex datasets.
Further, as discussed earlier, the problem of defending against
adversarial attacks still remains an unsolved problem even
for datasets with more structured images. Hence our method
can be used for practical applications such as secure medical
image classification (2018), biometrics identification, etc.
Human perception involves both discriminative and genera-
tive capabilities. Similarly, our work proposes a modification
to VAEs to incorporate discriminative ability, besides using
its generative ability to gain robustness against adversarial
samples. The input space dimensionality (to the decoder) is
drastically smaller compared to the input space dimension-
ality of image classifiers. Hence, it is much easier to attain
dense coverage in the latent space, thereby minimizing the
possibility of the occurrence of holes, leading to defensive
capability against both adversarial and fooling images. With
our construct, selective classification and semi-supervised
learning become feasible under the same framework. A pos-
sible direction of future research would be to study how
effectively the proposed approach can be scaled to more com-
plex datasets by using recently proposed invertible generative
modeling techniques.
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